

VZCZCXRO0122
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1658/01 3181514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131514Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2306
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTJF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001658

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [UNSC](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION: THE WAY
FORWARD

REF: A) KHARTOUM 1499
B) KHARTOUM 987

11. (SBU) Summary: The United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Chief told CDA Fernandez that the program will begin in Blue Nile state but will be postponed from 2008 to 2009. Both agreed that Blue Nile is the best location to begin, and further agreed that the international donor community is suffering from "Sudan Fatigue" which may negatively impact donor funding for disarmament. End Summary.

Postponement of DDR in the Blue Nile

12. (SBU) On November 12, Adriaan Verheul, Chief of the Integrated United Nations Unit for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) met with CDA Fernandez to discuss progress and obstacles to the DDR process. Verheul announced a postponement of the program's launch in Blue Nile state from the end of 2008 until mid-2009. Both agreed that it is preferable to wait until the conditions are right "to ensure DDR has a success story." Verheul stated that the timing wasn't right and DDR should follow an agreement of downsizing, but no downsizing agreement or process exists. Only estimates exist, and without a fully fleshed out program, continuing to push for DDR objectives is "putting the cart before the horse."

13. (SBU) Verheul explained other reasons for the program delay among them the lack of a legal agreement for land from the government and the lack of resources as the commission has yet to appoint a staff or provide funding. Verheul stated that with the lack of resources the job is "almost impossible," and added "the UN didn't get its planning right". He said the UN didn't start its planning process until six months ago so planning for required resources and the timing to allow the resources to move into place is lacking. He stated the reason the planning didn't take place was an increased emphasis on Darfur and a lack of belief that the DDR program could take place, given political realities in Sudan (ongoing conflict in Darfur and a desire to be prepared for conflict in most other areas).

Blue Nile: Case Study in How to Do it Right

14. (SBU) Both CDA Fernandez and Verheul agreed the Blue Nile state is the perfect location to start the program as a test case. The local governor, the SPLM's Malik Agar, has "a good track record and has developed a trusting relationship with Khartoum". Blue Nile is isolated, and its stagnant economy led to a militarized population, but some development is now occurring in the state. However the SPLA and SAF have either maintained or increased their numbers, beyond what is actually required, and there are troops which should not be required at this point. These factors make Blue Nile well

placed for troops to make a transition to other professions. CDA observed, "If the program is successful in the Blue Nile it can be used as an object lesson on how to do it right." Verheul added that the Nuba-based SPLA is the next priority before June or July 2009.

"Sticker Shock" and "Sudan Fatigue"

15. (SBU) Verheul voiced concern that "Sudan fatigue" has set in, and the international donor community is less likely to continue to donate funds to DDR if the current climate of questions regarding the political of the CPA parties will remaining unanswered. Donors have raised questions about transparency and downsizing that currently can't be answered. The fact that the SPLA is spending 1.6 billion (USD) a year on armament suggests they are not seriously ready to start a demobilization process. The CDA noted concerns in the South that the SAF and Misseriya nomadic Arab tribes continue to arm, and they may take advantage of DDR resources to use the program as "a revolving door." Verheul acknowledged that the donor community and the UN may finally say "enough is enough" as they examine their fiduciary responsibilities. Verheul said his interim goal is to maintain the process until the timing is right.

16. (SBU) Verheul recommended the U.S. and UN take a tiered approach in speaking with the donor community on funding requirements. Instead of presenting a final price tag up front and risking "sticker shock," the group should be given funding numbers just for the first three target areas of Blue Nile, Kordofan and Abyei. The CDA agreed and warned that both parties must be careful when approaching the host-nation government as they are "proud and stubborn" and should be treated carefully. He recommended that First Vice President Salva Kiir be provided a better understanding

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of what still needs to be done for the program to be successful. The CDA also recommended Sudan's expectations on financial management of the program require further explanation as the international donor community is not ready to unilaterally hand over the reins of a substantial budget.

Are we Buying Peace or is it Blackmail?

17. (SBU) When the current planning budget of more than \$1 billion USD is presented to UNHQ in New York, Verheul is worried he will lose EC, British and Dutch, and other critical bilateral donors if the "hardest questions" (outlined above) are not adequately answered. Without the backing of these countries, traditionally the financial and moral the backbone of most effective DDR programs, the program may lose up to 60 million USD that has already been pledged, not to mention political backing. Verheul suggested he might sway donors by stating that "peace comes with a price" but expressed concern this might sound like moral blackmail. However he expressed hope that if these three donors can be appeased, others will follow suit. He said pledges would be accepted with whatever strings donors may attach, as obtaining the funding will be the principle step in keeping the program alive.

Comment

18. (SBU) Verheul is correct in noting that, absent political will from the Sudanese parties themselves, there is little hope of success for his ambitious DDR program, especially with both sides wary of renewed conflict. He is right to start small with a pilot project in strategic Blue Nile state, then move to programs in volatile Southern Kordofan and Abyei.

FERNANDEZ